Spend any time in the throes of social media and one will come across what is known as the horseshoe theory. It is the idea that the political far-left and far-right actually have more in common with each other than either have with the political center. On its face, this appears nonsensical. After all, what would they actually have in common? The far right has always, and continues to, rail against ‘Marxists’, socialists, etc. And ‘fascist’ has always been the harshest slur in the left-wing lexicon.
Well, one thing they have in common as of late is proclaiming that it is the Ukrainians who are the fascists. No one embodies this strange alliance more than John Mearsheimer. Long a dullard reactionary, Mearsheimer, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has launched a second career on Leftist podcasts by blaming the whole gruesome affair on NATO. And Mearsheimer is hardly the only one. George Kennan is no longer with us, but based on how often he gets referenced it seems a safe bet if he was available, he would be making the rounds. Heck even Henry Kissinger has gotten the occasional plug from the likes of Noam Chomsky and Chris Hedges. Of course, the fact that Ukraine in not a member of NATO, nor yet even close to becoming one, appears lost to those cheering this narrative.
This sort of thinking goes beyond Ukraine. Writing in Counterpunch in April 2023, Richard Falk describes the importance of spheres of influence, the embodiment of Cold War realism:
Spheres of influence are admittedly abusive with respect to bordering societies, whether maintained by Russia or the United States, and yet in an imperfectly governed world such spheres in certain regional settings play crucial war prevention roles. They can mitigate potential geopolitical confrontations in which deference by antagonists to previously well-delimited spheres of influence can be credited with providing a brake on escalation at times of crisis…The idea of ‘geopolitical fault lines’ and even ‘spheres of influence’ are not well established in the practice or theory of international relations, but their existence is profoundly necessary for the maintenance of peace and security among Great Powers, and for the world generally.
Zaid Jilani, a writer at The Intercept at least recently added that the invasion of Ukraine is ‘illegal and unjustified’ before rushing headfirst into ‘it’s also their sphere of influence and there’s not going to be any resolution of it without figuring out a way to satisfy that interest.’
It goes on from there. Here are some Jacobin writers featured on a website called Responsible Statecraft, founded by the Quincy Institute, a ‘realist’ outfit that suggests that maybe it is a good idea that Bashar Assad continue to rule over Syria. Noam Chomsky likely ended his time as a public figure touting the likes of Klemens von Metternich, the architect of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 and long a hero to reactionary realpolitik types, as a responsible ‘statesman.’ In fact, regarding Ukraine, Chomsky said the same thing about Trump.
This kind of thing can go to even more bizarre lengths. Writing in Unherd, Thomas Fazi, a self-described socialist and another cheerleader for Kremlin imperialism in Ukraine (it was based on rational calculations after all: ‘From a realist standpoint, it is apparent that Ukraine provoked Russia’s invasion by entangling itself with a military alliance that Moscow views as a threat to its vital security.’), actually felt the need to ask Is There a Realist Case for Palestine?
The concept of ‘realpolitik’ goes back some ways. Perhaps one could say it is as old as civilization itself. The term itself was supposedly introduced by August Ludwig von Rochau in an 1853 work titled Practical Politics: An Application of its Principles to the Situation of the German States. This work would supposedly go on to influence Otto von Bismarck, another figure oft cited in realpolitik circles. The exact definition of the term probably would prove to be fluid, but Britannica seems to sum it up fairly as “politics based on practical objectives rather than ideals…a pragmatic no-nonsense view and a disregard for ethical considerations…relentless, though realistic, pursuit of national interests.”
It is particularly those last two points that have always rubbed Leftists and idealists the wrong way. To begin with, does every state get to define its own national interests? What if those interests include oppressing other states and peoples? Does this include dictatorships and their treatment of domestic resistance? Who gets to define what is realistic? And what are things like democracy, human rights, and liberation if not ideals? Are these things not worth fighting for?
Apparently not. For realpolitik types, dictatorships are recognized governments with real interests, imperialism is a simple fact of life, resistance is not only futile but destructive, the world is apparently made of nation-states where the main goal of politics is to maintain ‘stability’ between them, and responsible statesmen are the glue to it all. If one harkens back to 1789 and the origin of the Left/Right divide, the whole point was the supporters of revolution sat on the Left. That being the case, what does one make of those with claim the mantle of the Left yet are in the thrall of ‘stability’?
Earlier this month, the Washington Post published an op-ed by Robert Wright, author of the books Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, The Evolution of God, and Why Buddhism is True, as well as the host of the Nonzero podcast. If Wikipedia is to be believed Wright is also the godfather of what is called ‘progressive realism.’
The Nonzero podcast has featured the likes of Max Blumenthal, long an apologist for the likes of the Bashar Assad regime and Putin. On the podcast Blumenthal proclaimed ‘I’m sympathetic to Russia’s foreign policy in Syria, Crimea, Ukraine…in Syria Russian intervention, along with Iran, Hezbollah has saved a stable state from collapse.’ Besides the unspeakable putridness of openly expressing sympathy with an alliance of Russian and theocratic aggression notice again the reference to Syria as a ‘stable’ state. A fair description if being ruled by a hereditary crime family can be defined as stable.
On the surface, Wright’s overall theme in his op-ed sounds solid enough. With so many of today’s challenges, from global warming to the advance of AI, global in nature, the world needs collective responses. A more stable world will be better at tackling these things. Efforts to isolate dictatorships can lead them further into alliances with each other, thereby increasing global division.
Wright defines progressive realism like this:
There are different schools of realist thought, but there’s one policy principle they share — and it distinguishes true progressive realism…and for that matter from all mainstream schools of liberal foreign policy as well as from neoconservatism. It’s a principle that, simple as it sounds, could wind up saving the world.
That principle is this: You take nations as they are.
Furthermore:
From a realist’s perspective, statecraft is about crafting relations with other states, not crafting the character of other states. Realists favor holding nations accountable for their behavior toward other nations but aren’t big on holding them accountable for their internal affairs. So a realist foreign policy doesn’t prioritize the promotion of either democracy or human rights. And realists are especially averse to the coercive promotion of these things — through invasion or bombing or economic sanctions.
First here is the strange tendency in Leftist circles where whatever the domestic policies of particular states, when it comes to the platonic realm of ‘geopolitics’, everyone starts from zero. Still, one would like to show a bit of concern about, say, the treatment of the Uygur population in China or ethnic cleansing and famine in Sudan. Admittedly, that notion is largely based on silly ideas like solidarity and internationalism. However, it is not at all clear it is so realistic that such issues can be ignored. Domestic issues can become international ones quite quickly (the Syrian refugee crisis, Uygur slave labor in green supply chains). Not to mention that imperialism is often be driven by domestic politics. Putin has recently
spent a lot more time blathering on about the alleged historical Russian destiny of Ukraine and Georgia than he does about NATO. Wright says he is especially averse to things like bombings and sanctions which is certainly understandable, but it doesn’t seem too hard to think of policies in between those things (and since when are progressives and Leftists bound only by their government’s policies). Surely almost anything is better than the CODEPINK approach of standing on the street with signs that read ‘China is Not Our Enemy’ while Uyghurs toil in reeducation camps.
Wright’s other big point was about hypocrisy:
One of realism’s key strategic assets: “cognitive empathy,” that is, trying to understand how other leaders and peoples perceive the world. As one of realism’s founding thinkers, Hans Morgenthau, put it, good strategy requires a “respectful understanding” of all relevant perspectives. “The political actor,” Morgenthau wrote, “must put himself into the other man’s shoes, look at the world and judge it as he does.”
If U.S. and western governments have violated international law, how can they been in position to lecture others or enforce such laws? He, of course, cites the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But that was obviously opposed by just about the entire global Left. Yet even on this overall point Wright quickly finds himself in the weeds. He writes that Putin:
warned that if “disdain for international law” continued, “the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied” and the world will reach “a dead end”…In Putin’s view, the United States ignored this warning (for example, by recognizing in 2008 the independence of Kosovo, whose separation from Serbia had come via a NATO intervention not authorized by the U.N. Security Council)
It is hard to believe that Wright is unaware that Kosovo’s independence, quite a noble cause, couldn’t come through the U.N. Security Council due to Russia and China’s opposition. Kosovo didn’t declare independence until 2008. At the time the UN General Assembly voted to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice where only six countries opposing it while 77 approved (there were dozens of abstentions as well). Kosovo is now recognized as independent by about 100 countries and is a member of the World Bank and IMF. The countries that to this day don’t recognize Kosovo’s independence boil down to Serbia, Russia (Serbia’s longtime patron), China (obviously with its eye trained on Tibet and Taiwan), and a scattered bunch of states aligned with them. Look at it this way: for obvious reasons, Israel didn’t recognize Kosovo until 2020. Obviously, this kind of realism goes only so far.
As for the spheres of influence, it seems obvious that whole house of cards could be sent flying by simply pointing out none of people pushing this line would have an ounce of understanding for any U.S. sphere of influence. Actually, their basis for this whole concept appears to be that the whole planet is an American sphere of influence and, well, who can blame others for doing what has to be done. That’s why the endlessly repeated canard about Mexico joining some kind of Chinese-led alliance and the U.S. ‘blowing Mexico away’ because of it is just a mix of cynicism and reaction. It does nothing but reveal the sympathies of those who shout it.
In his analysis Falk briefly mentioned ‘abuse’ to ‘bordering societies.’ That seems a rather quick brush-off to describe what places like Kosovo, Ukraine, Georgia, and Central America endured. What is progressive about the idea that the little people have to be crushed in the name of greater stability? Is it not much more realistic to simply oppose oppression and imperialism wherever and whenever they are happening? It seems the surest route to the world of global governance that Wright and other ‘realists’ say they favor.